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Why are some childrenmore socially anxious than others? One theory holds that socially anxious children are poor
mindreaders, which hampers their social interactions; another that socially anxious children are advanced min-
dreaders leading to heightened self-consciousness in social situations. To test these theories simultaneously, this
study (N = 105, ages 8–12) assessed children’s mindreading (accuracy in detecting mental states from the eye
region), self-consciousness (indexed as physiological blushing during public performance), and social anxiety
levels. Results support both theories, showing a quadratic relation between mindreading and social anxiety. Low
mindreading was related to clinical levels of social anxiety. High mindreading was related to subclinical levels of
social anxiety through blushing. Our ﬁndings suggest two social-cognitive pathways to heightened social anxiety.
From an early age, children are motivated to bond
with others. In order to form and maintain such
bonds, they internalize the norms of the group they
belong to and they care about the impression they
make on others (Gilbert & Trower, 2001; Tomasello,
2009). In late childhood and at the emergence of
adolescence, relationships with others become
increasingly important (Beidel & Turner, 1988).
Consequently, at this age, children’s concerns with
being evaluated unfavorably increase (Westenberg,
Drewes, Goedhart, Siebelink, & Treffers, 2004). For
some children, these evaluative concerns become
excessive, giving rise to high levels of social anxiety
(Ollendick, Benoit, & Grills-Taquechel, 2014).
Heightened social anxiety refers to the exces-
sive fear of negative evaluation in social situations
in which an individual is exposed to the possible
judgment of others (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). Although it is clear that
increased social anxiety is rooted in heightened
concerns about being evaluated negatively by
others (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg,
1997), it is less clear what underlies these con-
cerns. Scholars have long speculated that these
concerns result from impaired social cognition,
that is, the abilities to understand other people
(Banerjee & Henderson, 2001; Hezel & McNally,
2014; O’Toole, Hougaard, & Mennin, 2013). One
such ability, the ability to accurately detect others’
mental states based on external cues (i.e., min-
dreading; Baron-Cohen, Jolloffe, Mortimore, &
Robertson, 1997), may be of particular importance
for the development of evaluative fears and
heightened social anxiety. This study investigated
mindreading ability in relation to childhood social
anxiety.
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Mindreading
Mindreading allows people “to put themselves
into the mind of the other person, and ‘tune in’ to
their mental state” (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill,
Raste, & Plumb, 2001, p. 241). Thus, mindreading
enables the detection and recognition of others’ men-
tal states based on external cues, such as people’s
facial expressions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Domes,
Heinrichs, Michel, Berger, & Herpertz, 2007). For
example, people may identify someone’s sadness
based on his or her facial expressions or someone’s
focus of attention based on his or her gaze.
Mindreading paves the way for more complex
forms of mental state understanding, such as rea-
soning about mental states in the service of predict-
ing and explaining others’ actions (Sabbagh, 2004).
For example, people may infer that a person is sad
because he or she did poorly on an exam only if
they ﬁrst recognized that the person is sad based
on the sad facial expression (Sabbagh, 2004; Wash-
burn, Wilson, Roes, Rnic, & Harkness, 2016). Thus,
people are able to interpret and reason about
others’ mental states accurately only if they are suc-
cessful in recognizing those mental states.
One of the most commonly used tasks to assess
the mindreading ability is the Reading the Mind in
the Eyes Task (RMET; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001),
which asks people to recognize other people’s men-
tal states based on cues from the face. Unlike tests
that require interpreting and reasoning about men-
tal states, such as standard Theory of Mind tasks
(Wellman & Liu, 2004), the Happe’s Strange Stories
(Happe, 1994), the Faux Pas Test (Baron-Cohen,
O’riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999), and the
Social Situations Task (Rogers, Viding, Blair, Frith,
& Happe, 2006), the RMET is solely a mindreading
test (Fertuck et al., 2009). Thus, the RMET indexes
mindreading ability but not necessarily the ability
to reason about others’ mental states and predict
future actions (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
Mindreading and Social Anxiety
Although a number of past studies have investi-
gated sociocognitive skills in socially anxious chil-
dren, the knowledge about mindreading ability in
socially anxious children is currently scarce. Min-
dreading requires detection of peoples’ mental
states based on external cues, most commonly facial
expressions. Facial expressions are a major source
of information about other people’s mental states
(Planalp, DeFrancisco, & Rutherford, 1996) and are
particularly relevant for socially anxious individuals
for whom others’ facial expressions may signal dis-
approval or rejection (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).
Thus, the ability to decode others’ facial expressions
in order to recognize others’ mental states is espe-
cially relevant to study in socially anxious individu-
als as they may be particularly prone to show
disturbances in this ability (Hezel & McNally, 2014;
Washburn et al., 2016).
There are two overarching theories about the dis-
turbances in mindreading related to social anxiety.
One theory, which we refer to as the sociocognitive
deﬁcit theory, holds that poor mindreading ability
may lead to a lack of or inaccurate beliefs about
others, which can make social situations unpre-
dictable and uncomfortable, resulting in fear and
social anxiety (Hezel & McNally, 2014; O’Toole
et al., 2013). Another theory, which we refer to as
the advanced sociocognitive ability theory, holds
that although advanced mindreading ability is typi-
cally advantageous in social settings, it may also
lead to heightened self-consciousness in social situa-
tions (Bechtoldt & Schneider, 2016), which, in turn,
leads to more evaluative concerns and social anxi-
ety (Hope & Heimberg, 1988; Tibi-Elhanany & Sha-
may-Tsoory, 2011). This study aims to integrate
these two theories and put them to the test in the
critical age of preadolescence.
Sociocognitive Deﬁcit Theory
Socially anxious children are concerned with how
other people may evaluate them and often fear and
avoid social situations (Beidel, Turner, & Dancu,
1985; B€ogels et al., 2010; Hudson & Rapee, 2000). The
fear and avoidance of social situations may be rooted
in children’s deﬁcits in recognizing other people’s
mental states and, consequently, poor understanding
of other people’s intentions and behaviors in social
situations (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Colonnesi,
Nikolic, de Vente, & B€ogels, 2017). Not being able to
decode accurately how other people feel or what
other people think may lead to inaccurate beliefs
about others and their behaviors. This may increase
confusion and unpredictability in social situations,
which may lead to fear and social anxiety (Colonnesi
et al., 2017; O’Toole et al., 2013). Supporting this per-
spective, two studies found that adults with social
anxiety disorder have more difﬁculties recognizing
other people’s mental states than adults without
social anxiety disorder (Hezel & McNally, 2014;
Washburn et al., 2016). Evidence in children is, how-
ever, currently lacking.
Past studies that investigated other sociocogni-
tive abilities, but not mindreading speciﬁcally,
2 Nikolic et al.
discovered deﬁcits in understanding others’ emo-
tions in children with high social anxiety levels
(Colonnesi et al., 2017) and adults with social anxi-
ety disorder (O’Toole et al., 2013). Children with
anxiety disorders (Broeren & Muris, 2009) and
adults with social anxiety disorder (Hezel &
McNally, 2014; Washburn et al., 2016) have also
been found to display deﬁcits in Theory of Mind—
the ability to predict others’ behaviors based on
their mental states (Wellman, 1990). Moreover, chil-
dren with high social anxiety levels—particularly
those with high levels of shy negative affect—have
been found to display deﬁcits in more complex
sociocognitive skills, such as understanding others’
motives for deceptive self-presentational displays as
well as the ability to identify and interpret the con-
sequences of an unintended faux pas (Banerjee &
Henderson, 2001). Children with high social anxiety
levels have also been found to display difﬁculties in
attending to audience characteristics and adjusting
to the attributes and preferences of a particular
audience (Banerjee & Watling, 2010). Finally, chil-
dren with anxiety disorders have been found to fail
to cope with social exclusion by attending to others’
mental states, which indicates deﬁcits in mental
state understanding in affectively charged contexts
(White et al., 2016). In sum, a number of past stud-
ies have suggested that deﬁcits in sociocognitive
skills may be related to greater social anxiety.
Advanced Sociocognitive Ability Theory
Typically, advanced sociocognitive abilities are
seen as socially advantageous because they allow
children to recognize and understand how their
friends and signiﬁcant others feel and think (Cutting
& Dunn, 2002). This makes it easier for children to
get along with others, have successful social interac-
tions, and be prosocial (Caputi, Lecce, Pagnin, &
Banerjee, 2012; Denham, 1986). However, advanced
sociocognitive skills may also come at a cost: Chil-
dren with advanced sociocognitive abilities may be
more sensitive to other people’s opinions of them
and may easily become aware that they are an object
of others’ attention and evaluation (Cutting & Dunn,
2002). This may give rise to heightened self-con-
sciousness and fear of negative evaluation—the core
of social anxiety (Sutterby, Bedwell, Passler, Deptula,
& Mesa, 2012). Thus, another theory of the role of
sociocognitive abilities in social anxiety holds that
advanced sociocognitive abilities may be related to
social anxiety (Sutterby et al., 2012; Tibi-Elhanany &
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). According to this theory, indi-
viduals with advanced sociocognitive abilities, such
as mindreading, spend more time observing others
in social situations (Moore, Bosacki, & Macgillivray,
2011) and are more attuned to social cues from others
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Consequently, they may
easily become aware that they are a subject of other
people’s evaluation, which may be unfavorable and
which can make them become highly self-conscious
(Bechtoldt & Schneider, 2016; Fenigstein, 1979).
Heightened self-consciousness in social situations, in
turn, may lead to the increase in evaluative concerns
(Banerjee, Benett, & Luke, 2012) and high levels of
social anxiety (e.g., Hofmann, Heinrichs, & Moscov-
itch, 2004; Hope & Heimberg, 1988).
Although there is no direct support for advanced
mindreading in socially anxious children, there is
evidence of advanced mindreading in undergraduate
female students with high levels of social anxiety
(Sutterby et al., 2012). Also, there is indirect support
for this theory from past studies that hypothesized
that other sociocognitive abilities may be related to
heightened social anxiety. For example, children with
advanced Theory of Mind and emotion understand-
ing have been found to be more sensitive to others’
criticism (Cutting & Dunn, 2002). Also, children and
adolescents with advanced sociocognitive ability of
recursive thinking were found to experience
increased state anxiety (indexed as cortisol response)
while anticipating giving a speech, suggesting that
those with advanced social cognition may have eval-
uative concerns when anticipating being exposed to
others’ evaluations (van den Bos, van Duijvenvo-
orde, & Westenberg, 2016). Finally, adults with social
anxiety disorder have been found to attribute affec-
tive mental states to others more accurately than
individuals without social anxiety disorder (Tibi-
Elhanany & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Together, these
studies suggest that advanced sociocognitive skills
may be related to greater social anxiety.
Blushing As an Index of Heightened Self-Consciousness
and Its Relation to Social Anxiety
Heightened self-consciousness in social situations
refers to the increased awareness of the self as a social
object (Buss, 1980; Schlenker & Leary, 1982). A physi-
ological marker of heightened self-consciousness in
social situations is blushing (B€ogels, Alberts, & de
Jong, 1996; Buss, 1980; Crozier, 2012; Leary, Britt, Cut-
lip, & Templeton, 1992). Blushing is an involuntary
reddening of the face, neck, or upper chest in socially
charged situations (Drummond, 2012; Leary &Mead-
ows, 1991). People blush when they are concerned
that other people may evaluate them negatively
(Buss, 1980; Crozier, 2012; Leary & Meadows, 1991).
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Because fear of negative evaluation is at the very core
of social anxiety (American Psychiatric Association,
2013), socially anxious individuals are thought to be
particularly prone to blushing (B€ogels & Reith, 1999;
B€ogels et al., 2010; Nikolic, Colonnesi, Vente, Drum-
mond, & B€ogels, 2015).
Blushing is assumed to ﬁrst develop when chil-
dren acquire abilities for self-awareness and for
understanding other people’s minds, which give rise
to the realization that other people may evaluate
them negatively (Leary et al., 1992; Lewis, 2001).
Children, like adults, blush when they are concerned
about others’ possible unfavorable evaluation (Dar-
win, 1872/1998). Children with high levels of social
anxiety, thus, display increased blushing in social sit-
uations in which they are exposed to others’ evalua-
tions (Nikolic, Brummelman, Colonnesi, de Vente, &
B€ogels, 2018; Nikolic, Colonnesi, de Vente, & B€ogels,
2016; Nikolic, de Vente, Colonnesi, & B€ogels, 2016).
Because socially anxious individuals may
overestimate the extent to which they blush in social
situations (Nikolic et al., 2015), self-reports of blush-
ing may not be reliable. Unlike self-reports of self-
consciousness, which rely on interoceptive awareness
(Turner, Scheier, Carver, & Ickes, 1978), physiological
blushing provides an objective measure of the experi-
ence of heightened self-consciousness in ambiguous
social situations (Crozier, 2004).
Present Study
The aim of this study was to integrate and test
hypotheses stemming from the two theories on the
role of sociocognitive abilities in childhood social
anxiety simultaneously. In line with the sociocogni-
tive deﬁcit theory, we hypothesized that deﬁcits in
mindreading would be associated with greater
social anxiety in children. In line with advanced
sociocognitive ability theory, we hypothesized that
advanced mindreading would be related to greater
Figure 1. The moderated mediation model: Next to the direct negative effect of mindreading on social anxiety, the relation between
mindreading and social anxiety is partially mediated by blushing but depending on the levels of mindreading. That is, blushing par-
tially mediates the relation between high (but not low) mindreading and social anxiety. At low levels of mindreading, the model
reduces to the sociocognitive deﬁcit theory model; the lower the score on mindreading, the higher social anxiety, hence the greater the
chances to develop clinical levels of social anxiety. At high levels of mindreading, the (positive) indirect effect from the advanced
sociocognitive theory model dominates over the negative direct effect; children with high (but not low) levels of mindreading blush
more, which in turn, relates to higher levels of social anxiety. At very high levels of mindreading, one, thus, also has higher chances to
develop subclinical (and possibly clinical) levels of social anxiety.
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social anxiety. To integrate these hypotheses, we
modeled a quadratic relation between mindreading
and child social anxiety. We further assumed that
advanced mindreading would be related to greater
social anxiety indirectly through heightened self-con-
sciousness (indexed through blushing). We, thus, pre-
dicted that advanced mindreading would be
associated with more blushing, which in turn would
be related to higher levels of childhood social anxiety.
We tested all these hypotheses simultaneously, in a
partial moderated mediation model (Figure 1).
According to this model, (a) lower mindreading is
directly related to higher levels of social anxiety and,
(b) at the same time, mindreading is related to higher
levels of social anxiety indirectly, through blushing,
but depending on the individual’s level of mindread-
ing. Speciﬁcally, only high (but not low) levels of min-
dreading are related to higher social anxiety through
blushing. To test this model, we measured 8- to 12-
year-old children’s mindreading abilities, physiologi-
cal blushing during public performance, and social
anxiety reported by children and parents.
Method
Participants
Participants were 105 children (56% girls) aged 8–
12 (M = 9.50 years, SD = 1.18 year; 85% Caucasian)
who were accompanied by one of their parents (77%
mothers) aged 25–60 (M = 43.00 years,
SD = 6.15 years) to the Family laboratory of the
University of Amsterdam. They were recruited
through public elementary schools in the Netherlands
for a larger study about sociocognitive and physio-
logical indices of social anxiety. Parents received
information letters about the study, and those who
signed in were invited to the laboratory. Families
were recruited from low to upper-class urban neigh-
borhoods. Parents were relatively highly educated:
57% graduated from a university, 18% graduated
from college, and 35% ﬁnished a high school or voca-
tional education. Children received active informed
parental consent prior to their participation in the
study. The study was approved by the Ethics Review
Board of the Faculty of Social and Behavioural
Sciences at the University of Amsterdam.
Procedure and Measures
Social Anxiety
During the laboratory visit, both the child and the
parent completed the Social Phobia and Anxiety
Inventory adapted for children to index child’s social
anxiety (child report: Social Phobia and Anxiety
Inventory for Children [SPAI-C], parental report:
SPAI-C-P, English version: Beidel, Turner, & Morris,
1995; Dutch version: Utens, Ferdinand, & B€ogels,
2000). Both versions of the questionnaire consist of 26
items and a 3-point Likert response scale (0 = never,
2 = always; child report: M = 11.99, SD = 8.19,
a = .96; parental report: M = 11.43, SD = 8.56,
a = .94). Sample items include: “I feel anxious when I
am with other girls, boys, or adults and I am in the
center of attention (when everyone is looking at me)”
in the child report version and “My child feels anxious
when she or he is with other girls, boys, or adults and
she or he is in the center of attention (everyone is look-
ing at her or him)” in the parent-reported version.
Previous studies support the validity of the ques-
tionnaire. They have demonstrated high internal
consistency of the SPAI-C, a = .96 (Beidel, Turner,
Hamlin, & Morris, 2000) and SPAI-C-P, a = .93
(Higa, Fernandez, Nakamura, Chorpita, & Dalei-
den, 2006). External and discriminative validity
analyses have indicated that the SPAI can differen-
tiate children with social anxiety disorder from chil-
dren with other types of anxiety disorders as well
as from healthy controls (Beidel et al., 2000). Mean
scores of SPAI-C for community samples reported
in previous studies typically range from 9 to 11
(Aune & Stiles, 2009; Kuusikko et al., 2009; Storch,
Masia-Warner, Dent, Roberti, & Fisher, 2004). Mean
scores of SPAI-C for healthy controls range from 4
to 7 (Beidel et al., 1995; Kuusikko et al., 2009;
Tuschen-Cafﬁer, K€uhl, & Bender, 2011), whereas
mean scores of SPAI-C for subclinical levels of
social anxiety disorder are around 13 (e.g.,
Tuschen-Cafﬁer et al., 2011). An empirically derived
cut-off score of 18 has been shown to best deter-
mine the presence or absence of social anxiety dis-
order (Beidel, Turner, & Morris, 1999), and this cut-
off score has been conﬁrmed by studies in different
samples (e.g., Kuusikko et al., 2009; Tuschen-Cafﬁer
et al., 2011).
Of note, the average score of social anxiety in
our sample was somewhat higher than those of
other community samples (e.g., Aune & Stiles,
2009; Storch et al., 2004) and those of healthy con-
trol samples (e.g., Beidel et al., 2000; Tuschen-Caf-
ﬁer et al., 2011), probably due to the self-selection
of our sample. Because our study was named “Shy-
ness and self-conﬁdence in childhood,” parents
with socially anxious children may have been more
likely to participate.
Because child report and parent report were cor-
related in our study, r(95) = .50, p < .001, we ﬁrst
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standardized the scores and then averaged them
into a composite score of child social anxiety for the
analyses. For the ease of interpretation and compar-
ison with other samples, we report on unstandard-
ized mean scores in descriptives and ﬁgures.
Mindreading
After completing the questionnaires, children
joined the experimenter in the laboratory roomwhere
they sat in front of a computer screen and took part in
the Child RMET (RMET-C; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
The RMET-C Test examines the mindreading ability
of children (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The test con-
sists of 28 black-and-white photographs of the eye
region of different people’s faces, each depicting a
speciﬁc state of mind (e.g., scared, happy, interested,
thinking about something). The photographs
appeared on the screen in front of the child along with
four descriptions of different mental states beneath
the picture. Each question contained one correct
answer and three wrong answers. Children were
asked to select the mental state that best described
what the person in the photo was thinking or feeling.
The number of correct responses was used to index
themindreading ability in children.
Blushing
Next, children were invited to sit in a chair in
the same room and photoplethysmograph and ther-
mometer sensors were attached to their right cheek
to measure their blushing response. When sensors
were attached, children sat silently and read a
comic book for 2 min, during which we recorded
the baseline blushing response. Afterward, children
were invited to choose a song of their liking that
they would perform on a podium. The children
were informed that a woman would come into the
room to record their performance and that she
would give the recording to a “professional singer,”
who would watch the recording of the performance
in a room close by. After the woman with a camera
entered the room and sat in front of the podium,
the children were invited to stand on the podium
and perform a song of their choice, in front of the
experimenter and a camerawoman, who was
“recording” the performance with a camera. After
the child stood up, the experimenter announced the
child’s performance: “And now, [name of the child]
will sing [name of the song] for us! You may
begin!”. From this point, the blushing response to
the performance was recorded (see Figure 2). All
children sang for at least 30 s (mean
duration = 51.94 s, SD = 20.17 s). To standardize
the length of the blushing recording, the blushing
response was calculated for the ﬁrst 30 s of the per-
formance because all children sang at least for 30 s.
The blushing response during the 2-min baseline
and during the ﬁrst 30 s of performance was mea-
sured with an infrared-reﬂective photoplethysmo-
graph device that was both direct current (DC) and
alternating current (AC) coupled. The AC compo-
nent represents the fast-ﬂuctuating blood ﬂow
depending on heart rate and corresponds to blood
pulse amplitude (Allen, 2007). The DC component
of the signal represents the static blood ﬂow in the
artery, vein, and tissue that varies slowly and corre-
sponds to blood volume (Allen, 2007). The plethys-
mograph output signal was ampliﬁed and ﬁltered
(low-pass, 0.75 Hz, 12 dB/oct for the “DC” signal;
high pass, 0.5 Hz, 36 dB/oct for “AC” signal). The
DC and AC output signals were converted to arbi-
trary values in the range of 0–65,535 (16-bit ADC)
at a speed of 200 S/s. Cheek temperature was mon-
itored unilaterally with a platinum PT1000 tempera-
ture sensor fastened to the skin on the cheekbone,
next to the infrared probe of the plethysmograph.
To control for individual differences in skin charac-
teristics, such as closeness and density of blood ves-
sels (Drummond, 2012), we calculated the
percentage increase from the 2-min baseline to the
ﬁrst 30 s of the performance for all outcomes: blood
pulse amplitude (AC reactivity), blood volume (DC
reactivity), and cheek temperature (temperature
reactivity). Higher values in reactivity indicate more
blushing during the performance. Because this was
the ﬁrst study to measure blushing in older chil-
dren, we did not have apriori hypotheses about
how three indices of blushing would be related.
The three physiological indices of blushing were
not correlated (Table 1) and were analyzed as sepa-
rate indices in the same models.
Data Analyses
Detected outliers ( 3 SDs) were Winsorized by
modifying their values to the closest observed val-
ues in the range of  3 SD (Keselman, Algina, Lix,
Wilcox, & Deering, 2008). One outlier above the
range of +3 SD was Winsorized for both AC and
DC. To investigate whether both high and low min-
dreading relates to child social anxiety, we modeled
a curvilinear relation between mindreading and
childhood social anxiety. We computed mean cen-
tered mindreading2 and included it in the analyses
next to the mindreading variable. In that way, we
were able to investigate whether a signiﬁcant
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quadratic relation existed next to the linear relation
(Mc Donald, 2008). The curvilinear regression
model was evaluated using IBM SPSS Statistics 24
(IBM Corporation, 2016).
To test our hypotheses leading to a quadratic
relation between mindreading and social anxiety,
that is, that low mindreading is directly related to
high social anxiety, whereas mindreading is related
to high social anxiety through blushing but depend-
ing on the level of mindreading, we ﬁtted the mod-
erated mediation model that is depicted in
Figure 1. Speciﬁcally, we tested (a) whether lower
mindreading predicted higher social anxiety
directly; (b) whether the mediating role of self-con-
sciousness (indexed as blushing), in the relation
between mindreading and social anxiety, existed
next to the direct effect of mindreading on social
anxiety; and (c) whether this partial mediation
depended on the levels of mindreading, such that it
existed only at high (not low) levels of mindread-
ing.
The evaluation of this model was carried out
step by step in R 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2015) using
the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012). First, we ﬁtted
a saturated moderated mediation model based on
our hypotheses. That is, both the blushing variables
and mindreading were allowed to predict social
anxiety, whereas levels of blushing and its effect on
social anxiety were allowed to depend on min-
dreading. Residual variances and covariances were
estimated freely. Next, we used model comparison
to investigate whether the hypothesized mediation
by blushing could be assumed full (no direct effect
from mindreading to social anxiety), absent (only a
direct effect from mindreading to social anxiety), or
only partial (as the integrated model in Figure 1
implied). Subsequently, we investigated the roles of
the different blushing indices (AC, DC, and
temperature reactivity) in explaining the relation
between mindreading and social anxiety. That is,
one by one, we constrained the (moderated) path
from a blushing measure to social anxiety to zero
and evaluated the decrease in model ﬁt. If this
decrease would be signiﬁcant, this would imply the
(moderated) path was necessary; if not it could be
removed from the model. This procedure resulted
in a model in which only the necessary paths from
different blushing indices to social anxiety were left.
Next, we tested if the moderation itself was a neces-
sary assumption or that mediation could exist with-
out moderation. That is, we tested whether it is
necessary to assume that the mediating role of
blushing in the relation between mindreading and
social anxiety indeed depends on the levels of min-
dreading. To do so, we ﬁxed the moderation to
zero. If this ﬁxation would lead to a signiﬁcant
reduction in the model ﬁt, the assumption of mod-
eration would be necessary. Finally, we removed
insigniﬁcant residual covariances to end up with a
most parsimonious model. The results of both the
saturated and the ﬁnal model are reported in the
result section.
To obtain parameter estimates and evaluate the
goodness of ﬁt of the path model, we used the
maximum likelihood method. To overcome the con-
cern regarding biased standard errors (e.g., due to
the limited sample size), we calculated bias-cor-
rected bootstrap 95% conﬁdence intervals (CIs) for
all parameter estimates of the investigated effects
with 5,000 replications. The maximum likelihood
provided a chi-square (v2) test of model ﬁt. A sig-
niﬁcant v2 value indicates a discrepancy between
the model implied and the observed covariance
matrices, indicating that the model does not ﬁt the
data well. In addition to v2, we used the root mean
square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger &
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Child's Mindreading, Mindreading2), AC Blushing, DC Blushing, Temperature Blushing, and Social
Anxiety
n M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5
1. Mindreading 101 17.88 (3.27) — — — — —
2. Mindreading2 101 0.99 (1.16) .16 — — — —
3. AC 95 100.25 (103.02) .26* .04 — — —
4. DC 94 11.48 (41.67) .04 .04 .04 — —
5. Temperature 94 1.01 (1.89) .16 .14 .08 .08 —
6. Social anxiety 101 11.72 (7.35) .26** .37* .03 .02 .39***
Note. Mindreading2 is squared mean-centered mindreading variable. AC is blood pulse amplitude increase. DC is blood volume
increase. Temperature is cheek temperature increase. Social anxiety is a standardized composite of child and parent report. AC = alter-
nating current; DC = direct current.
*p < .050. **p < .010. ***p < .001.
Child Social Anxiety and Mindreading 7
Lind, 1980), the comparative ﬁt index (CFI; Bentler,
1990) and the Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI).
RMSEA of .01, .05, and .08 indicates excellent,
good, and mediocre ﬁt, respectively (MacCallum,
Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). CFI values above .95,
and NNFI values above .90 indicate good ﬁt (Hu &
Bentler, 1999).
We compared nested models by means of log-
likelihood difference testing (at the signiﬁcance
level of a = .05). This results in a v2-statistic, where
a signiﬁcant difference indicates a signiﬁcant differ-
ence in model ﬁt. We compared non-nested models
using the Akaike information criterion (AIC;
Akaike, 1987). The AIC penalizes for model com-
plexity, and the lower the value the better the rela-
tive ﬁt. We opted for full information maximum
likelihood, in order to handle missing values, which
were sporadically present. All tests were run at an
alpha level of a = .05.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Four children were excluded from the analyses
because: (a) they were not ﬂuent in Dutch (n = 1);
(b) the electrodes for blushing were not properly
attached to the cheek (n = 1); (c) the child was
younger than 8 years old (n = 1); and (d) the child
had an autism spectrum disorder diagnosis (n = 1).
Eight children had missing values for physiological
measures of blushing due to equipment failure.
Children with missing values did not differ in their
level of social anxiety from children without miss-
ing values in the analyses, t(103) = 0.21, p = .836.
Means, standard deviations, and zero-order cor-
relations between study variables are reported in
Table 1. Higher mindreading was related to more
blushing indexed through AC reactivity. Also,
higher mindreading was related to lower levels of
social anxiety. Mindreading2 was positively related
to social anxiety. Finally, more blushing indexed
through temperature reactivity was related to
higher levels of social anxiety. Because none of the
variables of interest was signiﬁcantly related to age
or sex, we did not include sex and age as covariates
in the path models (all ps > .050).
Main Analyses
Quadratic Relation
To examine the hypothesized quadratic relation
between mindreading and social anxiety, we ﬁrst
ran a regression analysis with mindreading and
mean centered mindreading2 as predictors of child-
hood social anxiety. The model explained a signiﬁ-
cant amount of variance, R2 = .18, F(2, 98) = 2.49,
p < .001. The effect of the linear term was signiﬁ-
cant and negative, B = 1.57, b = .21, SE = 0.69,
95% CI [2.93, 0.21], p = .024. The effect of the
quadratic term was signiﬁcant as well, B = 18.58,
b = .33, SE = 5.10, 95% CI [8.58, 28.58], p < .001,
providing evidence for a quadratic relation between
Figure 2. Experimental setting.
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mindreading and social anxiety, with both lower
and higher levels of mindreading relating to higher
levels of social anxiety (Figure 3).
Modeling a quadratic relation may, in some
cases, suggest the existence of a quadratic trend
when this trend actually does not exist (Simonsohn,
2017). Therefore, we additionally tested our
hypotheses about both low and high mindreading
being linked to higher social anxiety by employing
the two-lines approach (Simonsohn, 2017). Follow-
ing this approach, two regression lines are ﬁtted,
one for “low” values of the predictor and another
for the “high” values of the predictor. The quadra-
tic relation is present if both slopes are statistically
signiﬁcant and have opposite signs. To overcome
the concern regarding the limited sample size in
these regression analyses (n = 38 for low scores and
n = 31 for high scores), bias-corrected bootstrap
95% CIs were calculated for the coefﬁcients of the
investigated effects with 1,000 replications. Break-
points for lower and higher values of mindreading
were set apriori following the RMET norms for chil-
dren (Tonks, Williams, Frampton, Yates, & Slater,
2007). As children aged 9–12 on average score
between 60% and 70% (16.8–19.6 correct answers),
we set the breakpoint at 20 correct answers being
the starting point for higher scores (30% of the total
sample) and the breakpoint at 16 being the end-
point for lower scores (36% of the total sample) We
separately ﬁtted two regression lines for low and
high scores of mindreading on child social anxiety.
Both lines were signiﬁcant and of opposite signs,
b = .42, B = 1.03, SE = 0.32, 95% CI [1.62,
0.29], p = .009 for low scores and b = .34,
B = 0.86, SE = 0.39, 95% CI [0.09, 1.62], p = .032 for
high scores. Thus, the additional analysis conﬁrmed
that both lower and higher mindreading levels
were linked to higher levels of child social anxiety.
Of note, the levels of social anxiety in children
with low and high mindreading ability were not
the same as can be seen from the asymmetrical
shape of the function (Figure 3). The visual inspec-
tion of the ﬁgure reveals that, on one hand, at the
lowest levels of mindreading, children reached the
highest levels of social anxiety, which correspond
to the levels of social anxiety found in children with
diagnosed social anxiety disorder (e.g., Beidel et al.,
2000; Kuusikko et al., 2009; Tuschen-Cafﬁer et al.,
2011). On the other hand, at the highest levels of
mindreading, children reached the levels of social
Figure 3. The relation between mindreading and social anxiety. On average, the relation is negative (dark gray straight line). However,
the relation is curvilinear (semidotted black quadratic curve). The light gray and dark gray areas represent the regions at which min-
dreading levels predict subclinical and clinical levels of social anxiety, i.e., social anxiety scores of 13 and 18, respectively. Subclinical
levels of social anxiety are predicted when mindreading scores are 13 or lower and 23 or higher; clinical levels of social anxiety are pre-
dicted when mindreading scores are 12 or lower and 26 or higher. At the mindreading scores of 21 or higher, the indirect effect of min-
dreading on social anxiety through blushing is signiﬁcant.
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anxiety that correspond to the levels of social anxi-
ety found in children with subclinical levels of
social anxiety (Tuschen-Cafﬁer et al., 2011).
Testing the Moderated Mediation Model
In line with the integrated theory, we modeled a
moderated mediation model with blushing as a
mediator of the relation between high (but not low)
mindreading and child social anxiety (see Table 2
for models ﬁt statistics, and Table 3 for effect sizes
and CIs of the saturated model). This moderated
mediation of blushing in the relation between min-
dreading and social anxiety was expected to be par-
tial because we also assumed that mindreading
related to social anxiety directly. The model ﬁt com-
parison statistics showed that the partial mediation
could not be omitted because the model with the
full mediation resulted in a signiﬁcant reduction in
ﬁt. Thus, a direct effect of mindreading on social
anxiety was kept in the model. Next, removing the
role of AC reactivity in the relation between min-
dreading and social anxiety resulted in a signiﬁcant
reduction in ﬁt as well, and was retained in the
model. The roles of DC and temperature reactivity
in the relation between mindreading and social anxi-
ety could be removed from the saturated model with-
out signiﬁcant reduction in model ﬁt. Within that
model, the moderation effect of mindreading on the
relation between AC reactivity and social anxiety
could not be removed without a signiﬁcant worsen-
ing in model ﬁt, so we retained it. Removing insignif-
icant residual covariances led to a ﬁnal model with
18 degrees of freedom. In this model, all residual
covariances and correlations between interaction
variables and mindreading were set to 0 (all were
insigniﬁcant, as might be expected from the correla-
tional structure among the blushing indices). For the-
oretical reasons, we kept the path from DC reactivity
to social anxiety, despite it being insigniﬁcant. This
ﬁnal model did not ﬁt signiﬁcantly worse than the
saturated model, Model 1, Dv2(18) = 20.549, p = .303
and provided the lowest AIC. From this we conclude
that: (a) the relation between mindreading and social
anxiety was partially mediated, thus both the direct
effect and indirect effect of mindreading on social
anxiety existed; (b) AC reactivity (not DC or tempera-
ture reactivity) was the mediating variable in the
relation between mindreading and social anxiety;
and (c) that this partial mediation was moderated by
mindreading. That is, AC reactivity mediated the
relation between mindreading and social anxiety but
depending on the level of mindreading. Speciﬁcally,
AC reactivity mediated the relation between min-
dreading and social anxiety only for children with
high levels of mindreading.
The ﬁnal model with the standardized estimates is
depicted in Figure 4. The standardized and unstan-
dardized paths and effects are displayed in Table 4,
along with their CIs. When considering the individ-
ual parameters and their (bootstrapped) CIs, we can
draw similar conclusions as above: there was a signif-
icant positive effect of mindreading on AC, and min-
dreading signiﬁcantly moderated the effect of AC on
social anxiety. As a result, the indirect effect of min-
dreading on social anxiety through AC was signiﬁ-
cantly moderated. In addition, according to the
Johnson–Neyman region of signiﬁcance procedure,
the indirect effect became signiﬁcant at levels of min-
dreading of about 1.1 SD above the mean, b = .06,
B = 0.38, SE = 0.23, 95% CI [0.02, 0.90]. Thus, from a
mindreading score of around 21, higher mindreading
Table 2
Model Fit Statistics for the Different Tested Models
Model name 2LL v2 df p CFI NNFI RMSEA
RMSEA
L
RMSEA
U
RMSEA
p AIC BIC
1. Saturated model 4,178.45 — — — — — — — — — 4,266.45 4,381.51
2. No direct effect 4,182.07 3.62 1 .057 0.95 0.31 .16 .00 .35 .089 4,268.07 4,380.52
3. Role of AC removed 4,190.64 12.19 2 .002 0.82 1.55 .23 .12 .35 .007 4,274.64 4,384.48
4. Role of DC removed 4,178.96 0.51 2 .776 1.00 1.37 .00 .00 .13 .821 4,262.96 4,372.79
5. Role of temp removed 4,183.60 5.16 2 .076 0.94 0.21 .13 .00 .26 .127 4,267.60 4,377.44
6. Roles of both DC and
temp removed
4,184.38 5.93 4 .205 0.97 0.76 .07 .00 .18 .318 4,264.38 4,368.98
7. Drop moderation 4,188.52 10.07 5 .073 0.91 0.49 .10 .00 .19 .152 4,266.52 4,368.51
8. Final model 4,199.00 20.55 18 .303 0.95 0.93 .04 .00 .10 .568 4,251.00 4,318.99
Note. AC is blood pulse amplitude increase. DC is blood volume increase. Temp is cheek temperature increase. AC = alternating cur-
rent; DC = direct current; CFI = comparative ﬁt index; NNFI = Non-Normed Fit Index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approxi-
mation; AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion.
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was signiﬁcantly related to higher social anxiety
levels through increased blushing.
In sum, these results are in support of our hypothe-
ses that (a) lower mindreading is directly related to
higher social anxiety, (b) higher mindreading is
related to higher social anxiety indirectly, through
blushing, (c) but this indirect effect of mindreading on
social anxiety through blushing occurred only among
children showing high levels of mindreading.
Discussion
Two theories about the role of social cognition in
social anxiety exist: one holding that social anxiety
is rooted in poor mindreading ability and another
holding that social anxiety is rooted in advanced
mindreading ability through increased self-con-
sciousness. In this study, we aimed to unify these
two theories and test the integrative theory—that
childhood social anxiety is associated with both low
and advanced mindreading and that advanced min-
dreading is associated with social anxiety through
Table 3
Unstandardized and Standardized Coefﬁcients for the Saturated Model
Est SE SEboot Bias CI95Lower CI95Upper St. Est
Direct effects
Mindreading on social anxiety 1.35 .70 .84 .06 3.01 0.29 .18
Mindreading on AC reactivity 2.17 .82 .85 .00 0.71 4.03 .26
Mindreading on DC reactivity 0.11 .27 .30 .01 0.53 0.66 .04
Mindreading on temperature reactivty 0.23 .15 .16 .00 0.52 0.09 .16
AC reactivity on social anxiety 0.07 .10 .10 .00 0.28 0.13 .07
DC reactivity on social anxiety 0.13 .26 .24 .02 0.32 0.62 .04
Temperature reactivity on social anxiety 1.90 .47 .42 .04 1.08 2.73 .37
Moderation effects
Mindreading 9 AC Reactivity on Social Anxiety 0.19 .08 .09 .00 0.02 0.38 .25
Mindreading 9 DC Reactivity on Social Anxiety 0.12 .21 .25 .02 0.32 0.64 .06
Mindreading 9 Temperature Reactivity on Social Anxiety 0.60 .36 .34 .02 1.22 0.12 .15
Moderation indices
Social anxiety 0.42 .24 .25 .00 0.06 1.11 .06
AC reactivity 0.01 .04 .09 .02 0.10 0.31 .00
Temperature reactivity 0.14 .12 .13 .00 0.03 0.52 .02
Indirect effects
1 SD below the mean level of mindreading
Mindreading on social anxiety via AC reactivity 0.56 .40 .46 .00 1.86 0.07 .08
Mindreading on social anxiety via DC reactivity 0.00 .03 .12 .03 0.21 0.27 .00
Mindreading on social anxiety via temperature reactivity 0.58 .39 .43 .00 1.51 0.18 .08
Mean level of mindreading
Mindreading on social anxiety via AC reactivity 0.15 .22 .25 .00 0.83 0.24 .02
Mindreading on social anxiety via DC reactivty 0.01 .04 .08 .01 0.08 0.35 .00
Mindreading on social anxiety via temperature reactivity 0.44 .30 .32 .00 1.12 0.14 .06
1 SD above the mean level of mindreading
Mindreading on social anxiety via AC reactivity 0.27 .22 .19 .00 0.02 0.75 .05
Mindreading on social anxiety via DC reactivty 0.03 .08 .13 .01 0.13 0.47 .00
Mindreading on social anxiety via temperature reactivity 0.30 .23 .24 .00 0.94 0.07 .03
Note. AC reactivity is blood pulse amplitude increase. DC reactivity is blood volume increase. Temperature reactivity is temperature
increase. AC = alternating current; DC = direct current.
Figure 4. The ﬁnal moderated mediation model including stan-
dardized estimates. AC = alternating current; DC = direct current;
ToM = theory of mind; TMP = temperature; SA = social anxiety.
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heightened self-consciousness. In support of this
hypothesis, we found a quadratic relation between
mindreading and childhood social anxiety, such
that both poor and advanced mindreading abilities
were related to higher childhood social anxiety
levels. Advanced mindreading, but not low min-
dreading, was related to higher levels of social anxi-
ety through increased blushing (AC, i.e., blood
pulse amplitude). Thus, as hypothesized, advanced
mindreading was related to heightened self-con-
sciousness indexed as more intense blushing,
which, in turn, predicted greater childhood social
anxiety. By unifying the two theories on the role of
social cognition in social anxiety, our ﬁndings sug-
gest two sociocognitive pathways to social anxiety
in childhood.
Two Sociocognitive Pathways to Childhood Social
Anxiety
In line with our integrated theory, the ﬁndings
support the idea that there are two pathways to
childhood social anxiety: one through deﬁcits in
sociocognitive abilities and another one through
advanced sociocognitive abilities and heightened
self-consciousness. These ﬁndings have important
implications for the cognitive models of social anxi-
ety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).
These models emphasize the role of negative inter-
pretation bias in social anxiety, with socially anx-
ious individuals interpreting ambiguous social cues
as negative (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Math-
ews, 1988). Deﬁcits in sociocognitive abilities, and
low mindreading in particular, may facilitate this
bias. Speciﬁcally, when children lack an ability to
accurately assess how other people feel or think,
there may be more room for social ambiguity and
interpreting cues as negative.
To date, much less attention has been given to
advanced sociocognitive abilities and heightened
self-consciousness in social anxiety. Although it has
been assumed that socially anxious individuals are
more self-conscious in social situations than socially
nonanxious individuals (e.g., B€ogels et al., 1996;
Hofmann, 2007), precursors of such heightened self-
consciousness in social anxiety have remained
unknown. Here, we show that advanced social cog-
nition, and mindreading in particular, is associated
with heightened self-consciousness indexed as
blushing, which, in turn, relates to greater social
anxiety. Thus, our study suggests that the impaired
cognitive processes found in social anxiety may
arise from both deﬁcits and advanced sociocogni-
tive abilities found in childhood.
Deﬁcits in Sociocognitive Abilities and Childhood Social
Anxiety
Our results showed that the levels of social anxi-
ety were the highest at the lowest levels of min-
dreading. These levels of social anxiety have been
previously reported in children with diagnosed
social anxiety disorder (e.g., Beidel et al., 2000;
Kuusikko et al., 2009; Tuschen-Cafﬁer et al., 2011).
Therefore, our ﬁndings suggest that deﬁcits in min-
dreading may be related to clinical levels of social
anxiety. The ﬁnding that deﬁcits in mindreading
are associated with high social anxiety levels, and
possibly social anxiety disorder, is in line with past
studies that found that adults with social anxiety
disorder show impairments in mindreading ability
(Hezel & McNally, 2014; Washburn et al., 2016).
These ﬁndings are also in line with some past stud-
ies in children that found deﬁcits in other sociocog-
nitive abilities, such as emotion understanding and
Theory of Mind in relation to childhood social anxi-
ety or to constructs closely related to social anxiety,
such as temperamental shyness and behavioral inhi-
bition (Banerjee & Henderson, 2001; Broeren &
Muris, 2009; Colonnesi et al., 2017; White et al.,
2016).
It is likely that children with deﬁcits in min-
dreading display problems in social functioning
because they have difﬁculties decoding others’
mental states, which in turn impairs their under-
standing of how other people feel and think. These
difﬁculties may be an obstacle in predicting other
people’s behaviors in social situations. Ambiguity
and uncertainty of others’ reactions may enhance
confusion and fear in social situations that may, in
the long run, lead to anxiety in social situations
(Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009). Likely, social anxiety can
also enhance the deﬁcits in sociocognitive abilities
because it may lead to fewer social experiences and
fewer opportunities to “practice” social abilities,
such as accurately detecting other people’s mental
states from external cues (Colonnesi et al., 2017).
This may give rise to a vicious circle in which low
sociocognitive abilities and high social anxiety rein-
force each other over time. To reveal how this
vicious circle between mindreading and social anxi-
ety develops over time, longitudinal studies are
needed.
Advanced Sociocognitive Abilities and Childhood Social
Anxiety
To our knowledge, this study was the ﬁrst to test
the idea that advanced mindreading, and not only
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deﬁcits in this ability, may relate to greater social
anxiety in childhood. We found higher levels of
mindreading to be related to greater social anxiety
in children. This ﬁnding is in line with one past
study that found advanced mindreading in highly
socially anxious undergraduate female students
(Sutterby et al., 2012) and with another study that
found advanced emotion understanding in adults
with social anxiety disorder (Tibi-Elhanany & Sha-
may-Tsoory, 2011). The ﬁnding is also in line with
studies showing a positive relation between other
sociocognitive skills and anxiety in children and
adolescents (Cutting & Dunn, 2002; van den Bos
et al., 2016).
We theorized that the advanced decoding of
others’ mental states is related to child social anxi-
ety because it gives rise to heightened self-con-
sciousness indexed as blushing, which, in turn, may
lead to social anxiety. Our ﬁndings support this
hypothesis. Children with advanced mindreading
blush in social situations in which they are exposed
to judgments of other people, likely because they
easily become aware of the possibility that other
people may judge them (and that this judgment
may be negative). Blushing, in turn, may lead them
to feel uncomfortable in social situations, behave
more awkwardly, process social information in a
biased way, and avoid similar situations in the
future resulting in greater social anxiety in these
children.
Our results showed that, with the increase in min-
dreading, children may reach heightened, subclinical
levels of social anxiety (Tuschen-Cafﬁer et al., 2011).
It might be possible that these slightly elevated levels
of social anxiety are, in some cases, socially adaptive
—because children with high mindreading abilities
“read” others feelings and thoughts well, they may
be more attentive to others and put more weight into
what others think of them (Cutting & Dunn, 2002).
This may direct them toward behaviors that promote
cooperation and bonding with others (Gilbert &
Trower, 2001). Future research should examine
whether these elevated levels of social anxiety can
indeed be adaptive for children’s social functioning
and whether children with high sociocognitive abili-
ties are less likely to develop clinical levels of social
anxiety than children with deﬁcits in sociocognitive
abilities.
Our results show that children with higher min-
dreading ability who blush in social settings show
greater social anxiety. Yet, it is important to note
that, after we account for this effect, children with
Table 4
Unstandardized and Standardized Coefﬁcients for the Final Model
Est SE SEboot Bias CI95Lower CI95Upper St. Est
Direct effects
Mindreading on social anxiety 1.56 .71 .814 .04 3.16 0.01 .21
Mindreading on AC reactivity 2.42 .83 .848 .01 0.86 4.21 .29
AC reactivity on social anxiety 0.05 .10 .101 .00 0.25 0.15 .05
DC reactivity on social anxiety 0.09 .26 .237 .01 0.36 0.58 .03
Temperature reactivity on social anxiety 1.86 .48 .441 .03 0.10 2.75 .36
Moderation effects
Mindreading 9 AC Reactivity on Social Anxiety 0.17 .08 .087 .01 0.01 0.36 .22
Moderation indices
Social anxiety 0.41 .24 .25 .01 0.03 1.04 .06
Indirect effects
1 SD below the mean level of mindreading
Mindreading on social anxiety via AC reactivity 0.52 .42 .467 .01 1.70 0.20 .08
Mean level of mindreading
Mindreading on social anxiety via AC reactivity 0.11 .24 .258 .00 0.75 0.31 .02
1 SD above the mean level of mindreading
Mindreading on social anxiety via AC reactivty 0.30 .24 .201 .01 0.04 0.75 .05
“Total” effects
1 SD below mean level of mindreading 1.67 .68 .80 .04 3.23 0.10 .22
Mean level of mindreading 2.07 .74 .90 .03 3.92 0.37 .29
1 SD above mean level of mindreading 1.26 .70 .77 .05 2.81 0.23 .16
Note. AC reactivity is blood pulse amplitude increase. DC reactivity is blood volume increase. Temperature reactivity is cheek tempera-
ture increase. AC = alternating current; DC = direct current.
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higher mindreading, who do not blush in social sit-
uations, display lower levels of social anxiety. Thus,
high mindreading, accompanied by a low blushing
propensity, seems to be protective of high social
anxiety levels. As many previous studies reported,
children with highly developed sociocognitive skills
seem to be socially competent and socially and aca-
demically successful (e.g., Trentacosta & Izard,
2007; Zerwas, Balaraman, & Brownell, 2004). This
study adds to this accumulating evidence by show-
ing that these children may also be at low risk for
social anxiety but only when they are not highly
self-conscious.
Heightened Self-Consciousness and Its Relation to
Mindreading and Childhood Social Anxiety
The results of this study revealed, for the ﬁrst
time, that physiological blushing is related to
sociocognitive abilities. Since Darwin (1872/1998),
there has been an idea that blushing can appear
only when certain sociocognitive abilities are
acquired. This study shows that, indeed, better
sociocognitive abilities are related to more blushing
in social situations in which a child is exposed to
others’ evaluations of them. Our study was also the
ﬁrst to ﬁnd that blushing is related to social anxiety
in the critical age of preadolescence, which extends
previous ﬁndings on the relation between blushing
and social anxiety in young children (Nikolic,
Colonnesi, et al., 2016; Nikolic, de Vente, et al.,
2016) and adults (Nikolic et al., 2015).
Of note, blushing indexed as blood pulse ampli-
tude (AC) was related to mindreading and medi-
ated the relation between advanced mindreading
and social anxiety. Cheek temperature reactivity
was related to social anxiety directly, regardless of
the level of mindreading. Changes in blood pulse
amplitude and temperature were not related. This
is likely because blood pulse amplitude and tem-
perature changes capture different aspects of the
blush response. Blood pulse amplitude is a fast-
changing component of blood ﬂow, whereas tem-
perature changes occur slowly and are delayed
compared to the fast-changing blood pulse ampli-
tude (Cooper & Gerlach, 2012; Drummond, 2012;
Shearn, Bergman, Hill, Abel, & Hinds, 1990). Fast
changes in blood ﬂow are assumed to reﬂect tran-
sient states of embarrassment marked by short
blushes that disappear quickly (Voncken & B€ogels,
2009), whereas more slowly occurring changes in
the blush response may reﬂect blushing that results
from social stress due to prolonged social exposure
(Nikolic, Colonnesi, et al., 2016; Voncken & B€ogels,
2009). It is, thus, possible that children with
advanced social understanding blushed while per-
forming because they felt foolish and embarrassed
by performing in front of others. Other children,
who reacted with heightened temperature, may
have blushed because they felt distressed in this sit-
uation. Because we did not have a priori hypothe-
ses about how different indices of blushing would
relate to mindreading and social anxiety, our expla-
nation is post hoc and should be veriﬁed by future
research.
Finally, blood volume was not related to other
blushing indices, nor to mindreading and social
anxiety. Similarly, in the only previous study that
measured physiological blushing in young children,
blood volume was not related to children’s social
anxiety, whereas blood pulse amplitude and tem-
perature were related to children’s social anxiety
(Nikolic, Colonnesi, et al., 2016). It could, therefore,
be that blood volume is not a valid measure to cap-
ture the blush response in childhood.
Limitations and Future Directions
Our study should be considered in view of some
limitations. First, our sample consisted of Dutch
children from urban neighborhoods. It would be
interesting to investigate how sociocognitive abili-
ties are related to social anxiety in other, for exam-
ple, non-Western cultures in which social norms
and expectations, as well as the prevalence of social
anxiety, differ compared to the Western cultures.
Second, our study included a community non-at-
risk sample of children; thus, we cannot generalize
our ﬁndings to clinical samples of children. Future
studies should include children with social anxiety
disorder in order to investigate these processes in
clinical populations. Nevertheless, our ﬁndings
have important clinical implications showing that
deﬁcits in mindreading may be found in children
with clinical levels of social anxiety. Mindreading
could, therefore, be targeted in early childhood as a
risk factor for the development of social anxiety dis-
order. Third, our study targeted one sociocognitive
ability, namely mindreading. Thus, we cannot gen-
eralize on all aspects of social cognition. Future
studies could also investigate curvilinear relations
between other aspects of social cognition, such as
emotion understanding and predicting others’
behaviors based on their mental states and child-
hood social anxiety. Fourth, our study was correla-
tional precluding the investigations of the causal
role of self-consciousness in the relation between
advanced mindreading and social anxiety. Future
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studies that investigate these relations may proﬁt
from using experimental designs to manipulate self-
consciousness. Finally, in our two-lines approach,
the analyses were conducted with two groups of
children with high versus low mindreading ability,
limiting the sample size; future studies employing
this approach may beneﬁt from larger sample sizes.
Conclusion
This study offers the ﬁrst empirical evidence that
socially anxious children display both low and
advanced mindreading. Thus, there may be two
sociocognitive pathways to high childhood social
anxiety levels: one through deﬁcits in mindreading
and another one through advanced mindreading
and heightened self-consciousness. Whereas deﬁcits
in mindreading may pose risk for social anxiety dis-
order, high mindreading abilities may result in
social sensitivity that is reﬂected in increased self-
consciousness and heightened concerns about
others’ evaluations that do not necessarily develop
in a disorder. Nevertheless, both of these distur-
bances in sociocognitive abilities may have an
impact on children’s social functioning in every-day
life leading them to fear and avoid social situations.
Early prevention or intervention efforts targeting
social anxiety may focus on children’s sociocogni-
tive abilities. For children with deﬁcits in mindread-
ing, these efforts may focus on enhancing
sociocognitive abilities, whereas for children with
advanced mindreading, they may focus on tackling
the excessive mindreading and dealing with height-
ened self-consciousness and sensitivity to others’
opinions.
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